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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Introduction
The Brief of Appellee in this matter (hereafter Di Paolo's brief (DB)) is almost
completely unresponsive to the Brief of Appellant (hereafter Ranson's brief (RB)). Di
Paolo's brief depends on deliberate misstatement of facts well within Di Paolo's
knowledge, selective citation of the law when full citation tells strongly against her,
argument by assertion with no evidentiary support and which deliberately ignores facts
before this court, argument by implication which suggests legal theories but offers no
support from the statues or case law for such theories, and argument by unsupported
twists of language and leaps of logic.
In place of rational argument Di Paolo offers a catalogue of vicious, demeaning,
sexist prejudice directed at Ranson. Without any evidence to support these claims, and
often in statements which are directly contradictory to one another, Ranson is represented
as a "malinger, selfish, non-productive, not industrious" (DB 6-7), "not devoted to his
family, self indulgent" (DB 40), and "refusing to support his family" (DB 7,40). For
good measure Di Paolo claims that Ranson is attacking the local legal community (DB
26). The purpose of these totally unsupported claims is to attempt to incite sexist
prejudice against Ranson in order to deny him a fair hearing on the merits of his case. Di
Paolo also hopes that she can persuade the court that Ranson's case represents an attack
on the Utah legal community of which the justices of this court are, of course, members.
By spreading these false arguments as widely as possible over her brief and
forcing Ranson to reply in specific, Di Paolo also hopes to reduce the consideration of
this appeal to the level of niggling detail and to distract this court from the larger issues at
1

hand. For this reason, in his Reply Brief Ranson will not attempt to reply to every false
point raised, but will group the arguments of Di Paolo so that the larger issues of the case
will reappear. He stresses that in doing so he will address only issues raised in Di Paolo's
brief. In the numerous instances in which Di Paolo has failed to respond to well
supported points in his brief, Ranson calls on the court to treat Di Paolo's failure as an
admission that Ranson's position is correct. He is also confident that this court will
ignore both the overt and covert attempts to sway its decision by appeal to prejudice.
Appellee's Statement of Facts
The statements offered as factual in Di Paolo's "Statement of Facts" are not facts
at all but are bald assertions unsupported by any evidence. Di Paolo seeks to paint a
picture of Ranson as a useless bum who for 20 years lazed around the house while she
did all of the work of the marriage. But she offers no evidence to support this claim
except her own unsupported testimony, given after the fact, when she is desperately
seeking to avoid paying the alimony which, under Utah law, is so thoroughly required.
As referred to in his "Statement of Facts", Ranson offered at trial Petitioner's
Exhibits 8-12 which demonstrate his direct involvement in Di Paolo's career. Most
telling of these is Petitioner's 8, a document which includes a draft in longhand by
Ranson, notes in his hand of a conversation with Di Paolo concerning it, a second draft in
his hand, and then a printed copy signed by Di Paolo as her own work. Ranson
introduced two file boxes of such material which showed his extensive involvement in:
Di Paolo's tenure appeal, preparing Di Paolo's Year's Work forms, her 1992 job search,
her research, and her demands for pay equity. Di Paolo went over these submissions
2

thoroughly at the time of trial and offered no evidence from them or any other source to
support her claims that Ranson was not extensively involved in her career.
Many of Di Paolo's claims are directly contradictory to one another and therefore
cannot both be true. As an example, Di Paolo states that Ranson is a, "malingerer who
refused to financially support the family" (DB 6-7) and that, "Kenneth's decision to stay
home rather than earn an income cost the family a full yearly salary compounded over
many years." (DB 11). Then, 20 pages later, apparently on the assumption that this court
will not be able to compare these statements, Di Paolo states that, "Kenneth had enjoyed
additional passive income of at least $18,000 per year working with the parties' joint
stock account." These statements are diametrically opposed. One of them must be a
deliberate falsehood. The fact that Di Paolo is willing to make deliberate misstatements
of facts well within her knowledge to this court, should cause the court to view with
suspicion all of the claims made by her.
In fact Ranson did earn, on average, $18,000 per year through investments, all of
which remained in the couple's joint stock accounts. Di Paolo gladly took her share of
these funds at the time of divorce, and now comes before this court to claim that Ranson
is a malingerer. Ranson explained thoroughly at trial why he could not make investments
of this kind in his post divorce financial condition (Trial Transcript, (hereafter TT) 2401), an explanation which was accepted by the court in its ruling when it concluded, "he
has some further but small income from land and security investments but that is
apparently a fairly small amount" (TT 621).
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As an example of the deliberately misleading statements made by Di Paolo
consider her assertion that, "Kenneth obtained his general contractor's license, and in a
later job application indicated he made $25.00 per hour during this period" (DB 8). This
creates a terrible impression, here is a licensed general contractor who has earned $25 per
hour seeking alimony. However neither of these implications is true. As Ranson pointed
out in his brief, he testified that he had never been a general contractor and Di Paolo's
own witness admitted under oath that she did not know if Ranson was a general
contractor or not (RB 44). Ranson also testified that no one had actually paid him $25
per hour, he arrived at that figure as an estimate of the value of his work in building the
parties home (RB44), and his earnings statement for these years (RB Addendum A-7),
shows no earnings whatsoever.
Di Paolo never disputes these points in her brief and they should be accepted as
true by this court. But here, by insinuation and unsupported, misleading statement she
attempts to place in the mind of this court the idea that they are true. Within the length
requirements of this brief Ranson cannot possibly reply to all of the false and misleading
statements made by Di Paolo. And indeed Di Paolo has relied on this as a conscious
strategy in larding her brief with such statements.
Di Paolo offered at trial, and offers here, no evidence that Ranson was not diligent
in caring for their home and child, that she asked him to return to work instead of
supporting her career, or that he was physically abusive to her. These completely false
claims are made in an attempt to paint a picture of Ranson that depends on sexist
stereotypes, which hold that the proper role of men is to support their families, that men
4

are not nurturing enough to raise children, that they are not good cooks or housekeepers,
and that any man who stays home to support his wife's career in not being "manly" and
so deserves nothing from this community. In OrrvOrr 99 S. Ct. 1102, the Supreme
Court of the United States rejected all such stereotypes as a basis for denying alimony to
men, as will be discussed further in Section A, infra.
Appellee's Point I
In this section Di Paolo almost completely fails to engage the arguments presented
by Ranson in his brief She says that the appropriate case law is Jennings v Stoker 652
P.2d 912, but fails to acknowledge that Jennings defers to Maltby v Cox Construction
598 P.2d 336 on this issue, and that Maltby was the case cited by Ranson. She cites
Marchand v Marchand 147 P.2d 538 as concerns mere differences of trial strategy, but
fails to address Ranson's extensive claims that his attorney was guilty of failure to
investigate. She claims that the trial court adequately considered the Maltby precedent,
but fails to address the fact that the trail court was influenced by Di Paolo's citation of the
minority opinion of Maltby in a deliberate attempt to mislead the court, and never saw
Ranson's correct citation of the majority opinion. Because Di Paolo fails to address the
logic of Ranson's arguments this court should accept those arguments as proven and
grant him a new trial on that basis.
Di Paolo asserts that Ranson raises issues in his brief that he did not raise before
the trail court. She, however, never says what these are, making consideration of this
point by this court impossible. She does offer in her addendum a copy of Ranson's
Motion for New Trial, and may be arguing that his claims are limited to those stated in
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the text of the motion. Included as Addendum A to this Reply Brief is a copy of
Ranson's affidavit which was attached to his Motion for New Trial. It can be seen that
the section labeled "Argument In Brief covers all of the issues raised in Appellant's
Brief before this court. Ranson does in fact present evidence to this court not presented
below. One of his essential claims is that his attorney deliberately failed to present an
adequate case on his behalf To demonstrate this he must, of course, present some of the
evidence which she failed to present at trial. This evidence should be considered by this
court as supporting Ranson's appeal.
Di Paolo claims that Ranson failed to show that any evidence existed that could
have been presented at trial which would have changed the decision of the court. Then in
the body of her brief following, she repeatedly argues that Ranson's claims should be
denied on the grounds, not that they are false or inequitable, but that the evidence, which
is at hand, was not submitted to the trial court. She does this in the case of: Ranson's
claim for funds for major purchases, his claim for retirement, his claim to have alimony
based on the marital standard of living, and the admission of his earnings history. It is
clear from Di Paolo's own brief that large portions of the extant, crucial evidence were
not presented at trial.
Two other deliberate misstatements of fact deserve mention here. Di Paolo asserts
that Ranson's physician refused to give, "an opinion as to whether Kenneth was
malingering and in fact found him employable" and that, "Kenneth failed to present his
attorney with a list of any other healthcare providers who could advance his claim" (DB
24-5). A glance at the document cited, (RB, Addendum A-5) shows that Dr. Barton was
6

reluctant to testify because he treated both Ranson and Di Paolo, and shows also an
extensive list of medical providers sent by Ranson to his attorney.
Appellee's Point II
Ranson will deal with the question of equal protection of the law in Section A and
with Di Paolo's claim for attorneys fees in Point IX, infra.
Appellee's Point III
Di Paolo asserts that the trial court made express findings that Ranson had
additional income to pay taxes. The evidence she cites from the Findings contradicts her
own claim. Item 59 states, "Upon the foregoing," that is in consideration of all of the
items taken cognizance of previously, "the Court finds...that Petitioner is able
to.. .enjoy.. .gross monthly income of $2,666" (Emphasis added). Among the foregoing
items, as cited by Di Paolo, are items 46 (b) and (c) which note a small income from land
investments and a small income from security investments. The actual language of the
trial court in its ruling, quoted supra, makes it even clearer that the trial court did not
consider Ranson's investments to be a reliable source of income. It is clear then that the
trial court ruled that when considering all of his sources of income Ranson's gross
monthly income would be $2,666. Di Paolo argues that Ranson fails to marshal the
evidence. She fails to respond to his presentation of the exhibit of her own witness, which
makes the necessary deductions from gross income to arrive at net income.
This court considered a nearly identical issue as recently as last June in Madsen v
Madsen 2006 App 267. Mrs. Madsen appealed on the ground that the trial court based
her ability to support herself on her imputed gross income. In Madsen this court cited
Bakanowski v Bakanowski 80 P.3d 153 to the effect that, "the findings of fact must show
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that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by the
evidence" and ruled that, "There is nothing in the trial court's findings of fact regarding
this discrepancy, much less the propriety or effect of basing Wife's ability to provide for
herself on imputed gross income" and reversed and remanded. To be consistent with its
own opinion in Madsen this court must reverse and remand on this issue.
In his brief Ranson pointed out that the expenses allowed him by the trial court do
not include any amounts for major purchases such as automobiles, major appliances, and
furniture. Di Paolo replies by saying that Ranson presented no specific evidence
regarding these expenses. This implies that without such evidence these expenses cannot
be considered. This is another deliberately misleading statement. In Davis v Davis 76
P.3d 716, this court considered an appeal by a husband who wished to reduce his alimony
obligations. He cites as errors in his wife's expense statement her inclusion of a sum for
retirement, and a $355 loan payment on a farm which was awarded to him. The trial
court accepted the wife's testimony that she was driving a high mileage car that would
need to be replaced and allowed her to consider the $355 as a car payment, with no
fiirther documentation. It also allowed her expenses for retirement on the ground that she
had less saved then her husband. This court affirmed both decisions.
In another deliberately false statement Di Paolo claims Ranson never testified as to
his major expenses. In fact, Ranson testified that during the marriage the parties routinely
paid cash for major purchases (TT 111), that at the time of the divorce they were saving
to buy a new car for him (TT 130), that his expense statement contained no amounts for
durable goods purchases such as clothing, appliances, or furniture (TT 151), and that the
8

amounts listed for car expenses were for repairs on a 13 year old vehicle (TT 171). This
court has stated repeatedly in cases such as Bakanowski and Haumont v Haumont 793
P.2d 421, that it will overturn alimony awards when such a serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Even without reaching the issue of standard of
living it is impossible to justify an expense calculation that does not include major
expenses, and this court should follow the precedent of its decision in Davis and reverse
and remand on this issue.
Appellee's Point IV
Di Paolo mischaracterizes the Bakanowski decision by saying that it would be an
extraordinary finding to include retirement needs in an alimony decision. She ignores the
relevant language accurately cited by Ranson in his brief, "The critical question is
whether funds for post-divorce...retirement accounts are necessary because contributing
to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped form the couple's
marital standard of living" (RB 27). She completely ignores the precedent in Gardner v
Gardner 748, P.2d 1076 (RB 26), in which the Utah Supreme Court overturned an
alimony award because it failed to equalize the parties standards of living after
retirement. In Davis, supra, this court upheld an alimony award based on the wife's need
to save for retirement. In Kemp v Kemp 2001 UT App 157, this court upheld an alimony
award because the parties regular savings deposits were part of the marital standard of
living.
Di Paolo repeats her argument that testimony cannot be considered as evidence for
expenses, which was disposed of by citation to Davis. At trial Ranson testified that he
9

did not have enough retirement to support himself (TT 139), that he was not eligible for
social security on his own earnings, or for any other retirement benefits except for the
small portion of the marital benefits he received (TT 143), and that he had made no
retirement calculations because it was only on the first day of trial that he had given up
his retirement benefits in the property settlement (TT 196).
Di Paolo also says that Ranson has no need for alimony because his "future was
made secure" by the property settlement (DB 33). Here Di Paolo implies a new legal
standard for alimony without any reference to the law. As will be demonstrated
irrefutably, infra, the standard for alimony in Utah is to maintain the recipient spouse at
the standard of living during marriage. If this court accepts the, "he/she has enough
already" standard it will endanger every alimony award made in this state in the last 30
years.
Di Paolo also refers repeatedly to the $80,000 Ranson was awarded from the
stock accounts. After taxes and attorney fees Ranson has approximately $46,000 in this
account to meet his needs for education, retirement, medical expenses, and transportation.
Ranson is driving a 15 year old vehicle, has no medical insurance, cannot afford all his
prescription medicine, and is unable to offer any financial assistance to his son. Contrast
this with Di Paolo who has $80,000 from these accounts, over a quarter of a million
dollars in retirement, and an income of $80,000 per year.
Appellee's Point V
The sole argument raised by Di Paolo in this section is that because Ranson's
counsel did not submit his statement of expenses during marriage to the trial court that he
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is forever barred from receiving alimony sufficient to maintain the standard of living
during marriage. Di Paolo makes no reply to the Gardner precedent cited by Ranson (RB
30). In Gardner, while the trial court relied on an expense statement and trial testimony
which showed expenses of $1,200 per month, our Supreme Court accepted and relied on
an expense statement prepared before trial showing $1,700 per month in expenses, and
awarded Mrs. Gardner alimony on that basis. The need to base alimony on the standard
of living during marriage is so fundamental to our system of family law that it can not be
excused on a mere technicality. Since Di Paolo does not question or reply to the Gardner
precedent, this court should either award alimony, or reverse and remand for an award by
the trial court based on the accurate statement of Ranson's expenses.
Di Paolo attempts to confuse the court by conjoining two items from the findings.
The first, item 47, records the court's statement in its ruling that it needed to consider the
parties standard of living during the marriage. Ranson did not notice until reading Di
Paolo's brief that her attorney had very cleverly removed the phrase "during marriage"
from item 47 in preparing the Findings. The actual language of the trail court is quoted by
Ranson in his brief (29) and is found in the Transcript (622). There the trial court
mentions the need to consider standard of living during marriage, but as pointed out in
Ranson's brief, does not do so. It proceeds, as stated in item 5 lof the Findings, to base
its decision solely on the standard of living at the time of trial. The removal of the
language "during marriage" from item 47, and its conflation with item 51 in Di Paolo's
brief, is another attempt to deliberately mislead this court. Utah Code 30-5-3 states that
the court may base its alimony decision on standards of living at the time of trial if this is
11

consistent with equitable principles. In this case the court cites no such principles and
gives no justification for its decision whatsoever.
Di Paolo also seeks to imply that Ranson has padded his expenses because he has
prepared four expense statements, each with a higher total than the last. The first two of
these statements were prepared when Ranson was being denied access to the parties
financial records by Di Paolo and so could not be accurate. What Di Paolo calls the
third statement is not a statement at all. It is the work product of his attorney, Romano,
which she improperly provided to Di Paolo, either inadvertently or deliberately, when
Romano was "scrambling" to prepare Ranson's case. The fourth statement was that
presented by Romano without Ranson's knowledge or consent, and which lists only his
expenses after separation. Di Paolo never mentions Ranson's one accurate statement of
his expenses during marriage, even though she received and relied on this statement
during arbitration. It is telling that she wishes to pretend that this statement doesn't exist.
Appellee's Point VI
Di Paolo notes that the trial court's power to equalize the parties post divorce
standard of living is discretionary. She then asserts that this case "presents no such
circumstances." She offers no evidence and no citation to the law, she merely attempts to
dismiss this issue from consideration by the baldest assertion.
In his brief Ranson set out extremely carefully the foundational cases of Utah law
which establish the rationale for, and the circumstances under which, post divorce
standards of living should be equalized . He also establishes the identity between his
circumstances and those of the women who received alimony in these foundational cases
12

(27-34). He also submitted the results of a statistical study which showed that in the
court in which he filed for divorce, in the time frame in which he filed, all women in
marriages longer than 10 years who had asked for alimony had received it (38-40). Di
Paolo makes no objection to this information and the court should accept it as
established.
In response to Di Paolo's claim, Ranson has closed the gap between the
foundational cases and current practice at the trial level, and researched recent cases at
the appellate level. In Peterson v Peterson 2001 UT App 51, this court listed in detail and
in order the steps necessary to determine an award of alimony. The second of these is,
"Then it [the trail court] should find her [the wife's] reasonable monthly expenses, taking
into account the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage" (Emphasis added).
The fifth step listed is, "If his [the husband's] reasonable expenses exceed his adjusted
income, he presumably should not pay alimony, other than as may be necessary "to
equalize the parties' standards of living..,{if this is a case} in which insufficient
resources exit to satisfy both parties' legitimate needs." (Emphasis added. The quote is
from Williamson v Williamson 983 P.2d 1103.)
In Batty v Batty 2006 UT App 506 this court states that, "Her [wife's] needs are
not simply those things needed for survival" and cites Frank v Frank 585 P.2d 453. This
court goes on to say, "Instead Wife's needs 'are assessed in the light of the standard of
living {the parties} had during the marriage' quoting Martinez v Martinez 818 P.2d
538 (Emphasis added). This court concludes, "if Wife is not able to meet her own needs,
the trial court should have determined the ability of Husband to fill the gap.. .with an eye
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toward equalizing the parties' standard of living only if there is not enough combined
ability to maintain both parties at the standard of living they enjoyed during the
marriage/' and cites Gardner (emphasis added). Frank, Martinez, and Gardner were, of
course, also cited by Ranson in his brief.
In Davis, supra, this court affirmed a verdict in which the trial court reasoned that,
"Wife had enjoyed a higher standard of living during marriage and that alimony was
needed to mitigate this disparity." In Kemp, supra, this court stated that, "trial courts
have been instructed to attempt to maintain the recipient spouse's marital standard of
living" (emphasis added). And went on to say, "we agree that an alimony award should,
whenever possible, be used to equalize the parties standards of living." In Christiansen v
Christiansen 2003 UT App 348, this court affirmed an award of alimony based on the fact
that the wife's standard of living during marriage was much higher than at the time of
trial. This court made nearly identical rulings on the same grounds in Charlton v
Charlton 2001 UT App 114, Starlev v Starlev 1999 UT App 46, and Bakanowski, supra.
It is then undisputed that in Utah the needs of the recipient spouse include those
items necessary to allow him or her to maintain the standard of living during marriage. It
is also clear that if adequate funds are not available to permit this, then the post divorce
standards of living of the parties should be equalized. These principles are fundamental
to the administration of family law in Utah. In his brief Ranson demonstrated that he had
prepared a statement of his expenses during marriage and that his attorney used it during
mediation. He reproduced an email in which, before trial, he asked his attorney
specifically if she intended to use this information and to pursue a claim for alimony to
14

allow him to maintain the standard of living during marriage, and mentioned many of the
same precedents cited above. She replied in a way which assured him that she would.
Then at trail she deliberately withheld this information from the court, a fact Ranson
could not realize until the entire trial was over.
If this sort of slight of hand by his own attorney can succeed in depriving Ranson
of his right to equal treatment, it does violence to the principle of equal protection under
the law as will be discussed, infra. However the Gardner precedent allows this court to
address this situation without reaching the equal protection issue. Consistent with its
decisions supra, this court should either award alimony or reverse and remand in
language that requires the trial court to consider, Ranson5 s statement of expenses during
marriage, and an award of alimony that will allow him to maintain the standard of living
during the marriage after divorce.
Di Paolo claims that Ranson is arguing for income equalization. She offers no
evidence to support this claim. Throughout his brief Ranson argues only for maintaining
the standard of living during marriage and equal standards of living. In his alimony
example Ranson does show equal incomes but points out in his brief that, "equalizing
incomes does not in fact equalize the parties' standards of living" due to the benefits Di
Paolo receives from her employment (34).
Di Paolo's claims again that Ranson needs are limited to his expense statement.
This has been dealt with twice, supra.
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Appellee's Point VII
Di Paolo attempts to convert Ranson5 s argument that he contributed to the
enhancement of her earning capacity during marriage, to an argument that he did not help
her obtain her education. Ranson was of substantial help to Di Paolo in completing her
dissertation and obtaining her Ph.D and the parties repaid her student loans out of marital
funds. However, while assistance in obtaining an education is one specific form of
advancing the career of a spouse, it is dealt with in Utah Code 30-3-59(8)(a)(vii) while
Ranson and Di Paolo both cite Utah Code 30-3-5(8)(e) in their briefs. This second
section makes no specific mention of education but only earning capacity.
Di Paolo makes no reply to Ranson's statement that her salary went from $17,000
to $78,000 during the marriage. This is because this is an established fact and no reply
would avail. Instead Di Paolo attempts to distract this court from the truth with a
repetition of the vituperative sexist arguments previewed in her Statement of Facts.
During the marriage Ranson built and paid for a home so that the parties could
afford to remain in Utah when Di Paolo's salary would not support her, much less both of
them. He was of crucial help in her career, cared for their child, maintained their house,
cooked and cleaned, sang in the church choir, volunteered in Sean's schools, coached his
soccer teams, earned money in the stock market which significantly increased the parties
savings, and in every respect played a full and productive role in the life of his family.
No evidence is offered to support any of Di Paolo's claims that he did not. She comes
forward now, after the fact, and declares herself unsatisfied with his work, and offers that
for this reason she should be excused from her legal obligation to pay alimony.
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The most common cause of appeal to this court in divorce cases is from men
seeking to reduce or eliminate their alimony obligations. This court almost always
refuses to end those obligations even under the most exigent circumstances. In Jones v
Jones 2005 UT App 287, Mr. Jones appealed from an award of alimony on the grounds
that his wife was an attorney who earned $50,000 per year and whose expenses included
large dry cleaning bills and a golf club membership. His appeal was denied, though this
court used its discretionary powers to modify the alimony award. In Ring v Ring 511
P.2d 155 the husband appealed to have alimony terminated on the grounds that he now
earned $8 per hour while his wife earned $50,000 per year. His appeal was denied.
Imagine how Messrs. Jones and Ring would have felt if they had known that they could
have avoided paying alimony entirely if they had, at the time of divorce, and with no
evidence but their own sworn testimony, accused their wives of being lazy slatterns.
If this court accepts Di Paolo's arguments in this matter it will endanger every
alimony award already in place and will compromise, if not destroy, the ability of our
courts to award alimony to needy spouses in the future. In the alternative it will be
creating a sexist system of alimony in which men can only pay but not receive support.
The violence this would do to equal protection will be discussed in Section A, infra.
Appellee's Point VIII
Di Paolo claims that Ranson failed to folly marshal the evidence. In his brief
Ranson quoted in foil the ruling of the court (20). As can be seen, this is extremely brief
and fails to meet the requirements for findings of fact by trial courts, "findings must be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
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the ultimate conclusion was reached on each factual issue." Cox v Cox 877 P.2d 1262.
While the trial court made no attempt to balance the contradictions in Famsworth's
testimony, Ranson nonetheless attempted to determine for himself what points the court
had relied on and listed those (RB 40). Di Paolo seeks to have this court dismiss
consideration of this issue because Ranson did not, in this section, list the Findings but
placed them in an addendum.
Di Paolo again appeals to sexual prejudice. She claims that Ranson was
"chronically unemployed." Women who stay home and care for their families are never
represented before Utah courts as unemployed or somehow engaged in a shameful
activity.
Di Paolo responds to none of the information raised by Ranson in his brief. She
simply reasserts her claims from trial. She says that Famsworth "accepted his
statements" (DB 43) to disguise the fact that Famsworth received no information from
Ranson (RB 40). Di Paolo claims that Famsworth found that Ranson was a licensed
general contractor. She ignores the fact that Famsworth admitted under oath that she did
not know if Ranson was a general contractor or not (RB 44). Di Paolo admits that
Famsworth believed that Ranson had earned $25 an hour when, as has been established
supra, he earned no such amount, ever. Di Paolo claims that Famsworth found that
Ranson could work as a construction manager and earn $45,000 per year, when
Famsworth admitted under oath that Ranson is not qualified to be a construction manager
(RB 42). Di Paolo says that Ranson's medical conditions were "fully discounted" by the
court and so should not have been considered by Famsworth (DB 44). Since these
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conditions were not "discounted" until after the court received the testimony of a
supposed expert witness who had never heard of them, this argument represents circular
reasoning at its worst.
Di Paolo says that Ranson claimed he could not work and claimed a disability.
Neither of these is true. Ranson claimed no disability and stipulated that he could work.
He claims that it is not safe for him to work in the uncontrolled environment of a
construction site. Construction is one of the "Big Four". Along with nuclear power, coal
mining, and transportation , it is one of the four industries which are far and away the
most dangerous in the nation. A person can be well enough to work in all of the other
walks of life and still not be able to work in these industries.
Di Paolo says that Ranson's addenda A-7 and F-l were "not admitted at trial".
This is another deliberate attempt to mislead this court. A version of F-l, using a
different earning level for Ranson, was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. A-7 was, of
course, never presented to the court but should be considered under the Gardner
precedent.
Appellee's Point IX
Di Paolo's claims for attorneys fees are chimerical and are designed solely to
frighten and oppress Ranson because he is a pro se litigant. In Mitchell v Mitchell 2002
UT App 403, this court found that "the sanction for filing a frivolous appeal applies only
in egregious cases with no reasonable legal or factual basis" and states as the standard,
"we cannot say that this is an egregious case where all competent counsel would
recognize that the arguments made...are without merit."
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Di Paolo cites the estate of Scheller v Pessetto 783 P.2d 70 as justifying unequal
treatment of men and women in alimony determinations. She cites none of the facts of
this case because they would refute her own argument. In Scheller this court found that
unwed mothers and unwed fathers were differently situated because the mother
physically bore the child and so could not deny parentage, as an unwed father can. As
Ranson has demonstrated repeatedly, there is no difference between his situation and that
of the women who receive alimony.
Di Paolo completely ignores and fails to respond to the results of a study of 297
cases submitted by Ranson to support his argument and then claims that, "Kenneth's
argument is based merely on speculation" (DB 46).
The evidence shows that illegal sexual discrimination is at the heart of this case
and affects every aspect of it. Ranson has now reviewed between 500 and 600 Utah
divorce cases. In every case of a marriage of long duration in which a woman has sought
it, she has been awarded alimony sufficient to maintain the standard of living during the
marriage. No man has ever been awarded such alimony and the only man to seek it,
Ranson, was awarded no alimony at all.
Ranson contacted 19 Utah family law attorneys and all of them refused to
represent him if he sought alimony. Finally one of their number did agree to represent
him, however, as abundantly demonstrated in Ranson's brief, she completely failed to
present an affirmative case on his behalf, deliberately misled him, refused to subpoena
witnesses at all or until it was too late, and, when necessary to insure that he would loose
his case, deliberately withheld crucial pieces of information from the court.
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The findings of the trail court concerning Ranson's earnings ability are further
evidence of sexual prejudice. In none of the over 500 cases consulted was a wife who
had been out of the workforce for a significant period found not to have suffered any
impairment in her earnings ability. The example of Gardner was given in Ranson's brief
In Davis, Mrs. Davis, who had worked outside the home for 12 years of a 35 year
marriage, was found to have low employment prospects. In Wall v Wall 2007 UT App
61, a wife who had just graduated from college was found to still require $800 per month
alimony. In Christiansen, supra,, a wife who had not completed college was awarded
$3,000 per month for seven years so as to complete a masters degree.
In this case it was found that after 20 years of marriage and 17 out of the
workforce, Ranson's earnings abilities had increased ten fold. This represents the sexist
idea enunciated by Di Paolo in her brief when she says, "male individuals generally have
better jobs and make more money." As shown in the citations to the case law, infra, it
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to treat a litigant as a member of
a class rather than evaluating their needs based on their individual circumstances. Most
men do not experience a 17 year break in their careers. Ranson is entitled to have his
earnings potential evaluated in comparison with people who have experienced such a
break, and those are the women who have been found to need alimony.
Sexual discrimination is evidenced by the virulently sexist language and sexist
assumptions in Di Paolo's brief. That a man is supposed to support his family, that a man
who supports his wife's career is lazy, a malingerer, not productive. All of these claims
have been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Orr vOrr as cited, infra.
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Section A-New Trial and Equal Protection of the Law
In her Points 1 and 2 Di Paolo raises the issue of new trial and equal protection of
the laws. In the interest of clarity and brevity Ranson has combined these issues for reply
here.
American courts have repeatedly held that the basic premise of the doctrine of
equal protection of the laws, applied to the states by the 14th Amendment, is that no
person or class shall be denied the same protection of the laws as other persons or classes
in like circumstances. And that the heart of this command is that the government must
treat citizens as individuals rather than as components of racial, national, or sexual
classes. Hooper v Bernalillo County Assessor 105 S. Ct. 2862.
In Orr v Orr, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a state could deny
alimony to men by statute. It ruled that a state could not and the reasons for its decision
are telling for this case. It held that, "the old notion that generally it is the man's primary
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify gender
discrimination. It went on to recognize the disparity of economic condition caused by the
long history of discrimination against women, but rejected the idea of using sex as a
proxy for need, or of denying alimony to men to compensate for discrimination in
marriage. The court wisely noted that such denial gave advantages only to women whose
husbands were in need. These, the court reasoned, were precisely the women who were
least likely to have been victims of discrimination.
It is clear then that Utah cannot deny alimony to men by statute. It is equally
clear, however, that Utah is denying alimony to men by practice, since no woman in
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Ranson's condition has ever been denied alimony and no man has ever been granted it.
This also violates the 14 Amendment, since the courts have found that equal protection
is violated by discrimination not only by the express terms of a statute, but also by its
improper execution, Edward Valves v. Wake County 471 S.E. 2d 342. Further, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found that discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct
evidence but may be inferred from the totality of relevant facts, Rogers v Lodge 102 S.
Ct. 3272.
The excuse offered for denying Ranson alimony is that his attorney failed to
present his case and that there is no legal principle by which he can be awarded a new
trial. In general the 14 Amendment does not apply to private actors, but private actors
become state actors when they exercise a state function, or when the state has become
significantly involved in, or state action significantly aggravates, private discrimination.
In Edmonson v Leesville Concrete 111 S. Ct. 2077, the Supreme Court found that
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race by a private
litigant violated equal protection. It reasoned that because there was statutory authority
for the challenges exercised, and the claimed constitutional deprivation had it source in
state authority, then in all fairness the private litigant must be viewed as a state actor. In
this case, when Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution requires the Utah
Supreme Court to govern the practice of law, and when the Rules of Judicial Conduct,
Part II, do in fact govern admission to the bar, conduct, and discipline of attorneys, the
right Ranson claims as violated must also be considered to have its source in state
authority, and Romano must be taken as a state actor.

However, even if we assume, in arguendo, that attorneys are private actors, the
state has clearly become so involved in and so aggravated the private discrimination as to
make it state action. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that: the impetus for forbidden
discrimination need not originate with the state if it is state action that enforces privately
originated discrimination, Moose Lodge v Irvis 92 S. Ct. 1965; conduct that is formally
private may become so entwined with governmental policies as to become subject to the
constitutional limitations placed on state action, Evans v Newton 86 S. Ct. 486; the action
of a state court taken to enforce private discriminatory agreements is state action, Shelley
v Kramer, 63 S. Ct. 836; and a court must assess the potential impact of official action in
determining if a state has significantly involved itself in invidious discrimination,
Reitman v Mulkey 87 S. Ct. 1627. In this case, where the state of Utah is prohibited from
denying alimony on the basis of sex by statute or judicial practice, it arrives at the same
result by relying on refusal, due to sexual prejudice, of Ranson's attorney to present his
case. A clearer example of private conduct becoming state action can hardly be
imagined, since the state relies on the private conduct to practice discrimination it is
clearly prohibited from practicing in any other way. This violates the constitution and
relevant authority.
The Supreme Court has also found that the proper remedy for a violation of equal
protection is to eliminate discriminatory effects and to bar like discrimination in the
future, U.S. v Virginia 116 S. Ct. 2264. The only way to achieve those ends in this case
is for this court to order a new trial, so that Ranson's entire case can be placed in the
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record, and so that a precedent can be created which will bar such discrimination in the
future.
In his brief Ranson presented the authority and the argument for the foregoing. He
did not however present the citations and he is now aware that this might constitute a
flaw in briefing, as it might affect Di Paolo's opportunity to respond. If the court finds
this to be the case the appropriate remedy is to allow supplementary briefing. There is no
reason Ranson should be denied a fundamental constitutional right from a cause that can
be so easily cured under the rules.
Conclusion
In order not to do violence to the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment
this court must reverse and remand this case for new trial.
If the court fails to reverse on that ground, to be consistent with its own rulings in
Peterson, Batty, and the catalogue of cases listed, the court must reverse and remand for
the trial court's failure to consider the statutorily required elements of standard of living
during marriage, standard of living post divorce, and increase in the earnings of one
party, and the precedentially required need to consider funds for retirement. It should
remand as well for consideration of the effects of prejudice and misleading information in
its determination of Ranson's earning ability, and the inequity of a finding of needs that
does not include major purchases.
In order to be consistent with its recent ruling in Madsen the court must reverse
and remand for findings on the propriety of basing the need for alimony on Ranson's
gross income.
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DATED this l T day of June, 2007.

Kenneth Clark Ranson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of June, 2007,1 caused to be delivered by first class
mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing corrected copy of the REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT to the following:
Robert Devin Pusey
140 West 9000 South, #7
Sandy, UT 84070

Kenneth Clark Ranson
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ADDENDUM A

Kenneth C. Ranson
2096 E. 10095 S.

Sandy, Utah 84092
801/942-8047
kennethranson@earthlink.net
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
KENNETH CLARK RANSON

:

Petitioner,

:

vs

:

MARIANNA DI PAOLO

:

Respondent

:

AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH
CLARK RANSON IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
ON THE GROUNDS OF
INCOMPETANCE OF COUNSEL

Civil No. 044900818
Judge Joseph C. Fratto Jr.
Comm r. Patrick Casey

PETITIONER, KENNETH CLARK RANSON, having been first duly
sworn under oath hereby submits the following affidavit in support of his
Motion for a New Trail on the grounds of ineffective representation of
counsel.
Argument in Brief
Ms. Romano's behavior in this case meets, more than abundantly, the
requirements set out in Utah case law for granting a new trial based on
incompetence of counsel.
In Maltby v. Cox Construction, Utah 598 P,2d 336 (1979) then chief justice
Crockett writing for a majority of the Utah Supreme Court, rejected the idea
that incompetence of counsel was grounds for reversal only in criminal cases
saying, "The purpose of all court proceedings is, of course, to do justice. If

the process has so clearly gone awry that an injustice has resulted, the court
in charge of the trial, or this court on review, should rectify such an
unfortunate occurrence, whether the proceeding is criminal or civil."
In State v. Lopez 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1994) Justice Howe writing for a
unanimous Utah Supreme Court accepts in determining effective assistance
of counsel the two pronged test advanced in Strickland v. Washington 466
U.S.668 (1984). "The first prong of the test requires the defendant to show
that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment." "The second prong requires the defendant to show
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
The facts of this case show clearly that my counsel Ms. Bridget Romano, of
the law firm of Kruse, Landa, Maycock, and Ricks, failed utterly to prepare
and document an affirmative case on my behalf.
She failed to present expert witnesses concerning my employability and
earnings capacity after I had been out of the workforce for 19 years, in spite
of the fact that she knew this would be a crucial issue in this case, that she
had assured me for ten months that she would prepare such evidence, and
that she knew that adverse counsel expected to present an expert witness on
the same subject.
She failed to present testimony by my medical advisors and to enter into
evidence my medical records, which document serious long term illnesses
which place limitations on my activity and which require continuing medical
care of the highest quality and substantial expense, in spite of the fact that
for ten moths she had assured me she would do so.
She did not review my testimony with me in spite of requests from me to do
so. She did not show me in advance the exhibits she intended to present at
trial or even tell me in full what issues she intended to address. She made no
effort to prepare me for questions which I might be asked by adverse
counsel. She did not explain to me how my need for alimony and current
earning ability would be determined by the court, leading me to believe that
my earnings from 25 years ago were not material and that my needs would
be established from my expenses during marriage, in accordance with
information she had presented at mediation. As a result I was completely
surprised while on the witness stand by a question by adverse counsel as to
what my earnings had been in the 1970s. I answered that I thought I had
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earned as much as $25,000 per \eai In fact the most T c\er earned in nil)1
one year is slightly over $8,00< * i id the court had this information it is
very unlikely that it would have found that I can n< ?\\ earn $32,000, or four
times my maximum earnings in any previous year.
gj i e delivered tQ a c | v e r s e c o u n s e i confidential information which I had
provided her to prepare my case. She never told me she had done this.
Adverse counsel then surprised me with this information while I was on the
witness stand and used it to impeach my testimonyShe refused to present my claim, as separate properu > n\\ college money,
which I used to construct my home ,and which I had always accounted for
separately. This claim is well supported in case law am! ! i<;» ided her
citations. Romano had always told me that she would pursue it, then three
days before trial she insisted that I abandon it Since she had previously
threatened to withdraw from representation and leave me without counsel at
trial I had no choice but to comply. The abandonment of this claim led to the
loss of this money and also allowed adverse counsel to represent that I had
le scant financial contribution to the marriage. Romano's behavior
,Av>Aated the requirement at law that she consult with me and that I have the
advantage of her counsel
Ms. Romano did all of the above in spite of having ten months to prepare for
trial, having been paid large fees to prepare, and having assured me many
tii i les that she would so prepare and that we were in agreement on the
structure and requirements of my case, Ms. Romano is a competent attorney
who currently worU - •• l \ '1 ih Attorney General's office and the fact that
she did not prepare my case under these circumstances is evidence that she
did so willfully, and th; , I her motivation was illegal sexual prejudice.
lliat the lack oi uie evidence stie tailed u; present pic juiced my case to the
extent that the proceedings cannot not be relied upon is indisputable, being
established by the words of this court in making its ruling. In that ruling the
court said that it needed to lake its finding on a preponderance of the
evidence presented at the trial \iui that it based its ruling on the testimony
and evidence of the witness Farnsworth, the employment counselor called by
mdent Tin court -lied on l;arnsworth's opinion to the exclusion of
petitioner's in matters oi employment and earning capacity I V court also
relied on Farns worth's opinion to the exclusions of petitioner s in matters of
his health sayi" fc"? >i *rankl\ don f hav M* ^ competent evidence to

Ranson v Di Paolo

Petitoner's Affidavit

4

that". In these words the court specifically notes the crucial lack of evidence
that Romano willfully refused to provide I spite or my entreaties that she do
so.
Argument in Specific and Supporting Evidence
Four times during the period I employed Ms. Romano to represent me I
briefed her extensively on my case, provided a theory of my case with legal
citations to support it, provided her with documentary evidence necessary to
the case, offered to provide such other evidence as she thought necessary,
and paid her large legal fees for her work. At the end of each of these
periods Ms. Romano declared herself fully prepared to move forward with
some affirmative aspect of my case. This was in every case a deliberate
misstatement of the facts. Every time we would reach the point where Ms.
Romano would have to admit that there was nothing more for me to do and
it was time for her to prepare an affirmative case on my behalf, she would
immediately drop all consideration of my case and frequently completely
forget all of the information I had paid her large sums of money to
familiarize herself with.
The first of these events occurred in October, 2004. I retained Ms. Romano
to represent me in this matter on September 1, 2004. While charging me
substantial fees she did nothing to advance my case, so that on October 26,
2004 when adverse counsel filed a certification of readiness for trial she was
forced to object, unsuccessfully, on the grounds that, as she admits in her
Objection, she had done nothing to advance my case. A copy of the
Objection is included as exhibit Al
In November, 2004 Ms. Romano continued to charge me substantial fees for
her work. On November 29, 2004 we met and I presented her with an
outline of my case. At that time I asked her to subpoena my medical records
and testimony about my medical condition from my primary care physician
Dr. Lewis J. Barton and provided her with his contact information. I also
asked her if I needed to see an employment counselor. Copies of the
memoranda I gave her at that meeting are enclosed and marked Exhibits A2
and A3 respectively.
In spite of our meetings and her promises to do so Ms. Romano never
prepared a formal response to a settlement proposal put forward by the
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Respondent. As a result w e were unprepared, for a pretrial hearing which
adverse counsel requested and which was ordered by Commissioner Casey.
I therefore asked Ms. Romano to postpone **v hearing until she was
prepared. She did inquire of adverse counsel 11 the hearing could be
postponed. When he did not agree the hearing took place without adequate
preparation on the part of Ms. Romano. A cop\ of an email of December 1,
2004 from Ms. Romano to me in which she admits to not preparing a
settlement offer is enclosed as Exhibit A4. A copv oi an email from me to
Ms. Romano of the same date in which I remind her mat 1 have delivered to
her the memo (of Exhibit A2) and ask her to now mo\ e forward with my
case, is enclosed as Exhibit A5.
At the pre-trial conference which u as held on December 2, 2004 the parties
were ordered to engage in mediation. At that time Ms. Romano told me that
she would actively work \o obtain * ;m diator and prepare for mediation.
This was a deliberate misstatement ot I act. She in fact did nothing to
prepare for mediation, to respond to respondents settlement offer, or to
prepare an affirmative case on my behalf. On January 20, 2005 I received
an email from Ms. Romano in which she informed me that adverse counsel
had unilaterally chosen the mediator and had arranged for the Respondent to
pre-interview the mediator and so establish a relationship with her. A copy
of this email is enclosed as exhibit \o \\ hen 1 complained i ^ Is. Komano
that it was injurious to i..\ interests that this matter be mediated by some
who.was alread} working with the Respondent, she told me there was
nothing wrong with this. \ eop\ ot thi^ email is enclosed marked Exhibit
A7
On April 5, 2005 Ms. Romano suggested to me in an email that si: .• : • i I :l! I
should prepare a written settlement response. A copy of this email is
included as Exhibit A8. I had, as shown above, agreed to this idea the
previous fall and had already paid her thousands of dollars and devoted
dozens of hours of my time in attempting to have such a document prepared.
In spite of all this Ms. Romano had never prepared any such proposal.
In response to her suggestion in the months of April and May, 2005 I spent
dozens more hours preparing and providing information to Ms. Romano and
paid her, and members of her staff many more thousands of dollars in fees
so that she would prepare a written settlement offer. H\ the end of May I
had provided Ms. Rom mo with all of the information she had requested, f
communicated the la^ i *)v • '• • '•<_•! n n M a v ^ 4 9 0 0 5 . t OP\ , 4 tlvv ^ n i .
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enclosed marked Exhibit A9, and then waited to hear from her that she had
prepared the long awaited written settlement proposal.
I next heard from Ms. Romano on July 18, 2005. A copy of this memo
marked Exhibit A10 is enclosed. She had not prepared a written settlement
proposal nor would she ever prepare one in spite of having promised to do
so, and having suggested herself that she should do so, repeatedly.
This email and two emails of July 21, 2005 marked Exhibits A l l and A12,
respectively, show further that Ms. Romano had completely forgotten about
my case and about all of the information which her responsibilities as
counsel required her to review and advise me about.
At this point Ms. Romano had represented me for over ten months. I had
presented her with outlines of my case and asked her to take steps to prepare
it at least as early as November 29/ 2004 as shown in the memos marked
Exhibits A2 and A3, and repeated those requests throughout her
representation of me as shown by a memo of February 8, 2005, marked
Exhibit A13. I had repeatedly asked her to subpoena my physician, refer
me to an employment counselor, and subpoena other information we would
need to prove my case. Ms. Romano had never suggested that she would not
take these steps but had always assured me that she would.
On July 18 there were 13 days left to issue subpoenas and prepare a witness
list for trial. Had Ms. Romano moved expeditiously to do so there was still
time for her to contact physicians so as to insure my medical records would
be entered into evidence and refer me to an employment counselor. She did
not do either of these things. On July 28, 2005 I sent her two emails, copies
of which are enclosed, marked Exhibits A14 and A15 respectively, saying
that I was not satisfied to react to the case of adverse counsel, that we
needed to present an affirmative case, and asking her to speak to my
physicians and to an employment counselor.
I discovered at this time that instead of working on my case as she had
indicated she would do in a meeting on July 26, 2005, that Ms. Romano had
gone on vacation with her family. When her legal assistant Jody Jenson
conveyed my emails to Ms. Romano, Ms. Romano announced her intention
to withdraw from my case and advised me to obtain other counsel. A copy
of Ms. Jenson's email containing Ms. Romano's response is enclosed,
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marked Exhibit A ; o, i he deadline for preparing a case was now the next
business day and the date of triai was r- *w 12 business days distant.
It is true that in this email Ms. Romano conveys to me for the first time, the
name of an employment counselor. But notice that she tells me that if I
consult this counselor I will do so completely on my own, Sine it was then
10AM on a Friday and since the deadline for submitting the witness list was
5PM of the next Monday I did not se how I could obtain an appointment
with this counselor unless Ms. Romano used her influence to get me one.
Since Ms. Romano never offered to add the counselor to the witness list and
indicated that I would be acting totally on my own, the provision of a name
alone does not constitute effective assistance of counsel.
It is also true that (Mi V. -:-\^\ ~\ 2005 Ms. Romano fin.ill}. onh i ^-nthafter I first asked her to spoke to m\ primarx care physician I .ewis J.
Barton. She found that Dr. Barton's testimony would oot help niv case. I
then asked her to contact any of the other physicians w ho hail treated me
over the last 6 years for serous health problems so that my medical records
could be introduced at trial. On August 4, 2005 she sent me an email
refusing to do this on the grounds that it was now too late to add name> io
the witness list. A copy of this email is included as Hxhibit A P . She then
argued instead, and for the first time in her now 1 I m< mth representation of
me, that my medical records were not necessary to a lair trial. Note that at
this point adverse counsel had still not delivered to Ms. Romano a ; opy of
employment counselor Farnsworth's report This report was later admitted
by the court after the m mal evidentiary deadlines. It Ms, Romano had been
similarity active in representing my interests it seems likely that my medical
records and an employment counselor's report o,n hv > ,-half nuild also have
been admitted.
If at this point iVi-.. IM ;; .. » had gunc to iiu- ^wuii, Luhiessed MCI failure to
prepare my case, and of ;e,ed to withdraw, as she had already threatened to
withdraw to intimidate me, it seems likely that the court would have granted
me a continuance. Instead Ms. Romano insisted on proceeding with my case
knowing full well that she had prevented the presentation of crucial evidence
necessary to the success of the case.
Ms. Romano continued to weaken my case with incompetent lack of
nrp.naratinn

Pnr QPVAral r m r i a l rtavc che stoiW^H all nr^naratinn fr*r trial in

order to prepare for other cases and to discuss a settlement: with adverse
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counsel. As a result she did not consult with me on the structure of the case
she intended to present. I never saw and have still never seen the exhibits
she presented in court except for such of them as were handed to me on the
witness stand. Ms. Romano made no effort whatsoever to prepare my
testimony in spite of repeated requests form me to do so. Her only advice
was to, "be careful", which is hardly adequate preparation. Ms. Romano
also delivered to adverse counsel confidential information from the files of
my case which he used to surprise me on the witness stand. An email of
August 12, 2005 in which Ms. Romano admits that she is scrambling, only
at that moment, to prepare the exhibits because she had put case preparation
on hold is enclosed as Exhibit A18
I had been asking Ms. Romano to contact physicians so that my medical
history could be submitted in evidence for over ten months. I had been
asking her to refer me to an employment counselor for the same period of
time. She had never indicated that she would not. I had provided her with
whatever information she asked for completely and promptly, setting aside
other duties to give first priority to this matter. I had paid her whatever fees
she thought to charge. I had then done everything it was possible for me to
do to have my case presented to this court. That Ms. Romano failed to
present these crucial aspects of my case was not a tactical decision. It was,
instead, a completely incompetent and apparently entirely deliberate act on
her part.
Her willful actions deprived me of the effective assistance of counsel and
denied me the right to a fair trial.
The only way in which justice can be done in this matter is for the court to
order a new trial at which I will be allowed to present the testimony of an
expert witness to counter that of Farnsworth, to present the testimony of one
of my physicians and to have my medical records, which contain evidence of
serious long term illness, entered into evidence before the court, to testify to
the actual amount of my past earnings, to see and participate in the
presentation of exhibits, and to have my case presented without confidential
attorney client communications being presented to adverse counsel.
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For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request the Court to grant a new
trial in this ma:
DATED this 24th day of
February, 2006.

Keni leth Clark R ansoi i
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On the 24th day of February, 2006, personally appeared before me
Kenneth Clark Ranson, the signer i)\ the lorcgoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of Februar)/ , 2006,1 hand delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT nv
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR M^W TRTM t- the f-^owi:iRobert Devin Pusey
140 West 9000 Sc>mh
Sandy, UT 84070

Kennetl I Clark R anson
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